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Duties of Fairness Between Separating Spouses: North Carolina
Continues to Find that all is Fair in Love and Divorce
The existence of a confidential relationship between a husband and wife in
the process of separating has been discussed with some regularity by the courts
during the past twenty years.1 In an effort to recognize women as equal partners
in marriage, North Carolina courts frequently have held separation agreements
to be arm's length transactions with the parties on equal footing in the negotia-
tions.2 In Avriett v. Avriett 3 the North Carolina Court of Appeals recently re-
stated its now common approach to separation agreements-neither party owes
a duty of fairness or full disclosure to the other.4 Dismissing a wife's claim for
rescission of a separation agreement she entered with her husband, the Avriett
court sent the message that it will not look beyond the face of a separation agree-
ment for substantive or procedural fairness, and that the morals of the market-
place will be applied to this often emotion-fraught transaction. 5
This Note outlines the position of the North Carolina courts toward separa-
tion agreements and contrasts it with the more sympathetic approaches used in
other jurisdictions. It then argues that a separation agreement should not be
treated as an arm's length transaction and that the special treatment afforded to
some other types of contracts due to their unique characteristics 6 should also be
applied to agreements between separating spouses.
Lynda and Robert Avriett were married August 16, 1969.7 In late 1985
they began to experience marital problems and discussed the possibility of sepa-
rating. 8 Mr. Avriett, with the full knowledge of his wife, consulted a lawyer.9
The couple continued to discuss the terms of their separation, including custody
of their son and division of the assets accumulated during their marriage. On
October 8, 1985, the Avrietts discussed their tentative agreement with Mr.
Avriett's lawyer, who prepared the eleven page separation agreement that both
parties later signed.10
In the settlement agreement, Mrs. Avriett waived all rights to her hus-
1. See infra notes 39-68 and accompanying text.
2. See infra notes 39-49 and accompanying text.
3. 88 N.C. App. 506, 363 S.E.2d 875, aff'd, 322 N.C. 468, 368 S.E.2d 377 (1988).
4. See infra notes 19-22 and accompanying text.
5. See Sharp, Fairness Standards and Separation Agreements: A Word of Caution on Contrac-
tual Freedom, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1399, 1458-60 (1984). Professor Sharp argues persuasively that
the marketplace mentality is antithetical to the husband-wife relationship and that subjecting it to
contract principles that govern relationships between strangers ignores the psychological and eco-
nomic realities of the marital relationship.
6. See infra notes 90-98 and accompanying text (outlining how partnership agreements and
antenuptial contracts are not treated as arm's length transactions and the parties are held to higher
standards of conduct).
7. Record at 1, Avriett v. Avriett, 88 N.C. App. 506, 363 S.E.2d 875 (No. 8712DC291), aff'd,
322 N.C. 468, 368 S.E.2d 377 (1988).
8. Id.
9. Id. at 21.
10. Id. at 2.
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band's military pension in consideration of his promise to pay her alimony.II
Mr. Avriett never tried to conceal the existence of the pension from his wife.
The agreement advised both parties that they had the right to separate attorneys
and that by signing they were waiving that right as well as the right to set aside
the agreement later on the basis of lack of representation.' 2 It also recited that
full dislosure had been made by both parties and that the settlement replaced
each party's right to equitable distribution.' 3
Although Mrs. Avriett knew about the pension, she did not fully compre-
hend its value or know that, unlike alimony, it would not terminate upon her
remarriage.14 Mrs. Avriett sought to have the separation agreement set aside on
the basis of fraud.
She alleged that her husband had violated their confidential relationship by
misrepresenting or concealing the advice he had received from his attorney re-
garding the value of his pension.' 5 The trial court granted defendant's motion
for summary judgment on two grounds. First, defendant was represented by
counsel with the full knowledge of his wife. The parties became adversaries
while negotiating the terms of their separation agreement and defendant had no
duty to disclose the information he received from his attorney to his wife. 16
Second, prior to executing the separation agreement and property settlement,
plaintiff was under a duty to read it for her own protection and was presumed to
know the contents of the instrument. With reasonable diligence, plaintiff could
have obtained separate legal advice 17 on the terms and conditions of the agree-
ment.18 From these conclusions of law, the trial court concluded that plaintiff
had not established a prima facie case of fraud.
The court of appeals affirmed the grant of summary judgment and held that
plaintiff's fraud allegation was fatally deficient for three reasons. First, the
cause of action was based on the existence of a confidential relationship with its
consequential duty to disclose. Because Mr. and Mrs. Avriett had begun negoti-
ating the terms of their separation and because Mr. Avriett had consulted an
attorney prior to the agreement with his wife's full knowledge, the court held
11. "In consideration of Wife's agreement to waive any and all interests in Husband's military
retirement pension... Husband does hereby agree to pay... $250 per month." Id. at 9.
12. Id. at 11; see infra note 17 and accompanying text.
13. "Both parties hereto agree that full and complete disclosure has been made with regard to
all the assets of each party hereto ... Both parties acknowledge that a mutually satisfactory division
has been made between them of all assets that have been disclosed to each other." Record at 12.
14. Id. at 2. Alimony usually terminates upon the wife's remarriage or death. The pension
would be considered property, not income. Once a portion of the pension was given to the wife, it
would be hers to keep regardless of any subsequent change in circumstances. Id.
15. Id. at 2-3.
16. Id. at 22.
17. Plaintiff alleged that she thought her husband's attorney was representing them both.
Neither the trial court nor the court of appeals addressed this allegation and there is no evidence that
plaintiff had any grounds for her belief. However, the separation agreement itself could be inter-
preted as implying one attorney for both parties. "Both parties hereto have been advised that they
have a right to seek separate attorneys... but they are agreed to the terms and conditions herein...
and do not desire separate counsel and waive any issues or defenses based upon not having separate
counsel." Id. at 11 (emphasis added).
18. Id. at 22.
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that any confidential relationship had terminated before the agreement was
executed. 19
Second, plaintiff's fraud allegation was based on defendant's failure to re-
veal to her the advice he received from his attorney regarding the relative values
of alimony and a property settlement that included a portion of his military
pension. The court ruled that fraud cannot be based on a failure to disclose an
opinion about a legal concept, nor will an agreement be set aside because the
other party is ignorant of the law.20
Finally, the court noted that the record clearly showed that plaintiff chose
to execute the agreement without discussing it with a lawyer even though she
knew defendant had consulted an attorney.2 1 She was informed that she could
consult counsel and she expressly contracted not to use this failure to obtain
separate counsel as a means of invalidating the agreement. 22
Judge Greene vigorously dissented, arguing for finding a confidential rela-
tionship between the spouses with its accompanying duties of fairness and full
disclosure.23 He insisted that neither separation 24 nor retention of counsel25 is
enough to create an adversial relationship. He reasoned that the existence of a
confidential relationship is a question of fact and that certain factors in this case
indicated that such a relationship continued to exist.26 Judge Greene consid-
ered summary judgment inappropriate because, when the evidence was viewed
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, a confidential relationship could have
been found. 27
Until recently, the history of contracts between husbands and wives in
North Carolina paralleled that of most states. The common law notion that a
19. Avriett v. Avriett, 88 N.C. App. 506, 508, 363 S.E.2d 875, 877, aff'd, 322 N.C. 468, 368
S.E.2d 377 (1988).
20. Id. at 508, 363 S.E.2d at 877-78.
21. Id. at 508, 363 S.E.2d at 878.
22. The court found nothing in the record to furnish a reason why Mrs. Avriett should not be
bound to what she agreed. Id. at 509, 363 S.E.2d at 878.
23. Id. at 508-09, 363 S.E.2d at 878 ("[T]he relationship of husband and wife is 'the most
confidential of all relationships.' ") (Greene, J., dissenting) (quoting Eubanks v. Eubanks, 273 N.C.
189, 196, 159 S.E.2d 562, 567 (1968)).
24. Id. at 510, 363 S.E.2d at 879 (Greene, J., dissenting) (citing Link v. Link, 278 N.C. 181,
193, 179 S.E.2d 697, 704 (1971)).
25. Id. at 511, 363 S.E.2d at 879. In a recent case, the court of appeals interpreted Joyner v.
Joyner, 264 N.C. 27, 140 S.E.2d 714 (1965), as holding that retention of counsel alone is enough to
terminate a fiduciary relationship. Harton v. Harton, 81 N.C. App. 295, 297, 344 S.E.2d 117, 119
(1986). Judge Greene questioned this decisiop, emphasizing the portion of the Joyner court's hold-
ing which stated that a confidential relationship terminates when one party employs an attorney and
negotiates through that attorney with the other spouse as adversary. Avriett, 88 N.C. App. at 511,
363 S.E.2d at 879 (Greene, J., dissenting).
26. Avriett, 88 N.C. App. at 511, 363 S.E.2d at 879 (Greene, J., dissenting). These factors
included the parties' negotiating the terms prior to separation, the husband's attorney not attending
the negotiations, and the wife not employing counsel at all. Id. (Greene, J., dissenting).
27. Id. (Greene, J., dissenting). Judge Greene concluded that it was for the jury to decide
whether Mr. Avriett's alleged statement that "payment of alimony was the same thing as receiving a
portion of his pension" constituted a statement of fact or one of opinion. Id. at 512, 363 S.E.2d at
880 (Greene, J., dissenting). Even if the husband's statement was an expression of opinion, "it would
nonetheless support an action for fraud if a confidential relationship were found to exist between the
parties." Id. (Greene, J., dissenting).
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wife's identity merges with her husband's to form one legal entity initially pre-
vented judicial recognition of any contract between husband and wife.28
However, in 1912 the North Carolina Supreme Court held that separation
agreements were not void as a matter of law.29 To be enforceable, an agreement
had to be fair to the wife, recognizing that she was not in an economically equal
position with her husband. The state initially assumed the burden of ensuring
that fairness. 30 In more recent cases, however, the courts have not rescinded
separation agreements on fairness grounds alone.31
One of the major reasons for this lack of development of fairness standards
was a statute, repealed in 1978, which required a court to examine privately the
fairness of separation agreements to the wife.32 These privy examinations were
little more than formalities but had a conclusive effect upon the validity of the
agreement. 33 Repeal of this statute in 1978 led to judicial denial of even the
limited protection provided by the privy examinations. 34 One commentator ex-
pressed the hope that repeal of the privy examination might free the courts for
deeper inquiry.35 This proved not to be the case 36 and though the privy exami-
nation statute did retard the growth of stricter standards regarding unfairness in
separation agreements, 37 its repeal did not effect the expected change.
With repeal of the privy statute, the current law allows a married couple to
28. See Sharp, Divorce and the Third Party: Spousal Support, Private Agreements, and the State,
59 N.C.L. REv. 819, 827 (1981); Note, Property Settlement or Separation Agreement: Perpetuating
the Confusion-Buffington v. Bufflngton, 63 N.C.L. REV. 1166, 1168 (1985).
29. Archbell v. Archbell, 158 N.C. 409, 413, 74 S.E. 327, 329 (1912).
30. See Ritchie v. White, 255 N.C. 450, 453, 35 S.E.2d 414, 415 (1945) ("There are three par-
ties to a marriage contract-the husband, the wife, and the State."); Smith v. Smith, 225 N.C. 189,
194, 34 S.E.2d 148, 151 (1945) (circumstances surrounding the execution of the agreement must be
fair and reasonable to the wife).
31. The courts continue to refer to a fairness standard in separation agreements but have not
examined this standard in depth. See, eg., Johnson v. Johnson, 67 N.C. App. 250, 255, 313 S.E.2d
162, 165 (1984); Murphy v. Murphy, 34 N.C. App. 677, 680, 239 S.E.2d 597, 599 (1977), rev'd in
part on other grounds, 295 N.C. 390, 245 S.E.2d 693 (1978).
32. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-6 (repealed 1978) ("[N]or shall any separation agreement between
husband and wife be valid.., unless [it] is acknowledged before a certifying officer who shall make a
private examination of the wife .... ).
33. Sharp, supra note 28, at 828-29, 833-34. In Biesecker v. Biesecker, 62 N.C. App. 282, 302
S.E.2d 826 (1983), the wife conveyed a deed to their marital home to her husband without considera-
tion. Although the husband had counsel when he signed the deed and the wife did not, the convey-
ance was upheld on appeal because the deed was acknowledged before a certifying officer in
accordance with section 52-6. Id. at 285, 302 S.E.2d at 828.
34. The repeal of the statute abolished any search for fairness that was previously required.
Knight v. Knight, 76 N.C. App. 395, 397-98, 333 S.E.2d 331, 332-33 (1985) (now that the statute is
repealed, contracts between husband and wife are enacted without providing the woman any extra
protection; parties are on equal footing and the judge need not make an independent determination
whether the agreement is fair). In dissent in Avriett, Judge Greene argued for a contrary interpreta-
tion. He believed that repeal of section 52-6 did not eliminate a court's duty to look into the fairness
of separation agreements. Avriett v. Avriett, 88 N.C. App. 506, 510, 363 S.E.2d 875, 878-79
(Greene, J., dissenting), aff'd, 322 N.C. 468, 368 S.E.2d 377 (1988).
35. Sharp, supra note 28, at 834 ("With the repeal of the privy examination statute and its
conclusive effect on findings of reasonableness and fairness, there exists for the first time in the state
the opportunity for courts to refuse to become parties to overreaching or unfair separation
agreements.").
36. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
37. Sharp, supra note 28, at 836-37.
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execute any separation agreement that is not inconsistent with public policy.38
Given North Carolina's traditional refusal to examine closely the separation
agreement once any indication of minimal procedural fairness is present, the
result in Avriett is not surprising. North Carolina courts consider termination of
a confidential relationship enough to satisfy procedural fairness. If no confiden-
tial relationship exists, the agreement will be enforced as valid.
Whether either party retains an attorney has been considered a major factor
by the courts in determining whether a confidential relationship still exists be-
tween spouses. In Joyner v. Joyner39 the North Carolina Supreme Court held
that when plaintiff negotiated through an attorney and dealt with her husband as
an adversary, the confidential relationship no longer existed. 4° The court also
held that negotiation through an attorney negates any presumption that the hus-
band has a dominating influence or that the wife did not know what she was
doing.41 Later cases continued the presumption established in Joyner that pres-
ence of an attorney means the confidential relationship has been terminated. 42
In Johnson v. Johnson the court indicated that it was inquiring into fairness, 4 3
yet the result was the same-validating the agreement on the basis that the com-
plaining spouse had an attorney.
The presence of an attorney will terminate a confidential relationship, but
lack of an attorney will not invalidate the agreement unless there are additional
extenuating circumstances. 44 The North Carolina Supreme Court set aside a
38. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-10.1 (1984) ("Any married couple is hereby authorized to execute a
separation agreement not inconsistent with public policy which shall be legal, valid, and binding in
all respects.").
39. 264 N.C. 27, 140 S.E.2d 714 (1965).
40. Id. at 32, 140 S.E.2d at 719.
41. Id. Joyner was the first North Carolina case to discuss the presence of legal representation
as a factor in determining the level of scrutiny that the court would undertake in determining fair-
ness. Earlier cases discussed the trust and confidence that accompanies a marital relationship and
presumed that the wife was dependent upon her husband. See, e.g., Fulp v. Fulp, 264 N.C. 20, 23,
140 S.E.2d 708, 711-12 (1965). In Murphy v. Murphy, 34 N.C. App. 677, 680-81, 239 S.E.2d 597,
599-600 (1977), rey'd in part on other grounds, 295 N.C. 390, 245 S.E.2d 693 (1978), the court
reiterated that any confidential relationship terminates as soon as the complaining spouse obtains an
attorney.
42. E.g., Harton v. Harton, 81 N.C. App. 295, 298, 344 S.E.2d 117, 119 (1986) (husband not
under a duty to disclose borrowing against life insurance policy he assigned to wife under the separa-
tion agreement; parties lacked a confidential relationship and were adversaries because they had
attorneys); Winborne v. Winborne, 41 N.C. App. 756, 759, 255 S.E.2d 640, 643 (husband had no
duty to disclose his adulterous relationship, which might entitle wife to alimony under section 50-
16.2, because wife had an attorney and parties negotiated as adversaries), disc. rev. denied, 298 N.C.
305, 259 S.E.2d 918 (1979).
43. 67 N.C. App. 250, 255, 313 S.E.2d 162, 165 (1984). ("Courts have thrown a cloak of
protection around separation agreements and made it their business, when confronted, to see to it
that they are arrived at fairly and equitably .... [R]elief will be granted if the settlement is mani-
festly unfair to a spouse because of the other's overreaching."). In Johnson, because both parties had
lawyers, the court of appeals found the agreement fair even though the husband was threatening to
expose the wife's unfaithfulness to members of the community. Id. at 255-56, 313 S.E.2d at 165.
The court also found that there was no duress because Mrs. Johnson sat in a notary's office for 30
minutes waiting to sign the agreement without appearing to be upset. Id.
44. See infra note 49 and accompanying text. Biesecker v. Biesecker, 62 N.C. App. 282, 285,
302 S.E.2d 826, 828 (1983), illustrates this point. In Biesecker the wife deeded her entire interest in
the marital residence to her husband without consideration when they separated, and 10 months
later the couple resumed living together only to separate again in 1981. During their reconciliation,
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separation agreement in Eubanks v. Eubanks45 but the case involved egregious
facts. The husband did not offer his wife an attorney or tell her that she needed
one. The court found this omission, combined with the wife's mental problems
(of which her husband was aware) and her minority status, sufficient to invali-
date the agreement.4 6 The court used forceful language, stating that the rela-
tionship between husband and wife was the most confidential of all relationships
and transactions between them had to be fair and reasonable. 47 This language
does not disguise the fact, however, that the dispositive factor in this case was
the wife's minority status. There is no indication that the unfairness alone
would have been enough to invalidate the agreement. 48
The general rule remains that the courts will not inquire into the fairness of
separation agreements when it determines that the confidential relationship has
ended. A lack of coercion and an opportunity to consult with an attorney are all
that is required to terminate the confidential relationship. 49 Avriett is the most
recent in a long line of cases establishing that any action indicating a less than
trustful relationship, including employing an attorney, will be construed as end-
ing the couple's confidential relationship along with its inherent duties of full
disclosure and fairness.
Most states do not terminate separating couple's duty to each other as
quickly as North Carolina. Some states provide by statute that a confidential
relationship exists between the separating husband and wife.50 In these states
Mr. Biesecker never reconveyed the title to his wife. When he filed for divorce, his wife requested
rescission of the deed. Id. at 283, 302 S.E.2d at 827-828. Although Mrs. Biesecker did not have an
attorney, the conveyance was upheld. Id. at 285, 302 S.E.2d at 828. The wife's claim that she did
not understand her legal rights because she did not have an attorney was also dismissed, for "[a]
person signing a written instrument is under a duty to read it for his own protection, and ordinarily
is charged with the knowledge of its contents." Id. at 285, 302 S.E.2d at 828-29. Unlike Eubanks,
no additional factors of fraud or duress were present. See infra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
45. 273 N.C. 189, 159 S.E.2d 562 (1968).
46. Id. at 194-95, 159 S.E.2d at 566-67.
47. Id. at 195-96, 159 S.E.2d at 567. "To be valid, 'a separation agreement.., must be in all
respects fair, reasonable and just, and... entered into without coercion.., and with full knowledge
of all the circumstances, conditions, and rights of the contracting parties.'" Id. (quoting Taylor v.
Taylor, 197 N.C. 197, 201, 148 S.E. 171, 173 (1929)).
48. Likewise, in Link v. Link, 278 N.C. 181, 179 S.E.2d 697 (1971), the court set aside the
wife's conveyance of corporate stock to her husband made when she did not have an attorney.
Again, however, the facts strongly suggested duress. The wife signed over securities to her husband,
an experienced businessman. Id. at 191, 179 S.E.2d at 703. Emphasizing the husband's business
acumen and his wife's inexperience, the court found a confidential relationship even though the
parties already had separated at the time. Id. at 193, 179 S.E.2d at 704.
49. Knight v. Knight, 76 N.C. App. 395, 396, 333 S.E.2d 331, 332 (1985) (wife did not speak
with an attorney but she had the opportunity to do so). The court in Knight held that "a separation
agreement should be viewed today like any other bargained-for exchange between parties who are
presumably on equal footing." Id. at 398, 313 S.E.2d at 333.
50. Eg., ALA. CODE § 30-4-9 (1983) ("All contracts into which [husband and wife] enter are
subject to the rules of law as to contracts by and between persons standing in a confidential relation-
ship."); NEv. REV. STAT. § 123.070 (1985) (husbands and wives enter into contracts with each other
"subject to general rules which control the actions of persons occupying relations of confidence and
trust"); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-2-2 (1978) (contract between husband and wife subject "to the gen-
eral rules of common law which control the actions of persons occupying confidential relations with
each other"); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3103.05 (Anderson 1980) (contract between husband and
wife subject "to the general rules which control the actions of persons occupying confidential rela-
tions with each other").
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any contract between married people, including a separation agreement, must
satisfy the statutory requirements of full disclosure and fairness implicit in a
confidential relationship.:5 Other states have adopted a presumption of a confi-
dential or fiduciary relationship through case law.5 2 In Christian v. Christian 5
3
the New York Court of Appeals set aside a separation agreement that heavily
favored the husband.5 4 The court refused to treat the separation agreement as
an arm's length transaction: "Equity is so zealous [in surveillance of separation
agreements] that a separation agreement may be set aside on grounds that would
be insufficient to vitiate an ordinary contract."'55
Other states do not use presumptions to define the relationship but instead
look at the circumstances of each case, categorizing them individually as confi-
dential or arm's length.56 Maryland, for example, does not presume the exist-
ence of a confidential relationship between husband and wife but considers
several factors, including age, mental condition, education, business experience,
and degree of dependence of the spouse in question to determine whether a con-
fidential relationship exists. 57 If the confidential relationship is found to have
terminated, the agreement is presumed valid unless shown to be unjust on its
face.5 8
51. See, e.g., In re Kesler, 59 Ohio Misc. 33, 38-40, 392 N.E.2d 905, 910-11 (1978) (Ohio
statute governing contracts between husband and wife controls in a separation agreement).
52. See 1 A. LINDEY & L. PARLEY, LINDEY ON SEPARATION AGREEMENTS AND ANTE-NuP-
TIAL CONTRACTS § 6.02 (1988) (law presumes that a "confidential relationship ... exists between
spouses [with] the attendant fiduciary duties of disclosure and fair dealing, particularly with regard
to finances").
53. 42 N.Y.2d 63, 72, 365 N.E.2d 849, 855, 396 N.Y.S.2d 817, 823 (1977) ("Agreements be-
tween spouses, unlike ordinary business contracts, involve a fiduciary relationship requiring utmost
good faith.") (citations omitted).
54. The agreement split the couple's individually owned stock in half, giving the husband 50%
of the wife's stock, which was worth $900,000. Although the wife received 50% of the husband's
stock as well, his individual portfolio was worth only $200,000. Id. at 67, 365 N.E.2d at 852, 396
N.Y.S.2d at 820.
55. Id. at 72, 365 N.E.2d at 855, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 824 (citations omitted); see also Levine v.
Levine, 56 N.Y.2d 42, 47, 436 N.E.2d 476, 478, 451 N.Y.S.2d 26, 28 (1982) (fiduciary relationship
between husband and wife calls for closer scrutiny of separation agreements and such contracts may
be set aside in equity under circumstances that would be insufficient to nullify ordinary contracts).
56. See, e.g., Koizim v. Koizim, 181 Conn. 492, 495 n.l, 435 A.2d 1030, 1033 n.1 (1980) (confi-
dential relationship found to exist because wife was accustomed to being guided by husband's judg-
ment since he was a lawyer and banker; she was justified in placing confidence in him); Castro v.
Castro, 508 So. 2d 330, 333-34 (Fla. 1987) (once the complaining spouse establishes that the agree-
ment is unreasonable, a presumption of concealment arises; the defending spouse can rebut by show-
ing full and fair disclosure or by showing that the complaining spouse had a general knowledge of
the extent and character of the assets sufficient to provide a reasonable estimate of their value);
DePaul v. DePaul, 287 Pa. Super. 244, 248-49, 429 A.2d 1192, 1194 (1981) (no confidential relation-
ship found because the parties dealt on equal terms and there was no dependence on either side); see
also supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text (Judge Greene, dissenting in Avriett, considered exist-
ence of confidential relationship a question of fact).
57. Bell v. Bell, 38 Md. App. 10, 15, 379 A.2d 419, 422 (1978). In Bell the court did not find a
confidential relationship even though the husband was much better educated than the wife. Evi-
dence that the wife had negotiated several changes in the agreement and questioned other provisions
led the court to hold that the parties were on equal footing and that the wife lacked trust and
confidence in her husband. Id.
58. Id. The presumption of validity, once established, is not easily rebutted. The Bell court
found that giving up $210,000 of property in exchange for $45,000 in cash and property was not
sufficiently unjust on its face to negate the presumption of validity established by lack of a confiden-
tial relationship. Id.
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States with community property laws often define the relationship of hus-
band and wife as encompassing a fiduciary duty.5 9 In Golder v. Golder60 the
Idaho Supreme Court allowed the wife to modify provisions of a property settle-
ment that the husband's attorney had drafted. The court held that the "marital
relationship imposes the high duty of care of a fiduciary on each of the
parties. ' 61
Similarly, California courts have held that marriage partners owe fiduciary
duties to one another at least with regard to the community property. 62 The
fiduciary relationship exists even if both sides have attorneys. In Vai v. Bank of
America63 the California Supreme Court noted that business partners are con-
sidered to have fiduciary duties to each other although each partner often has his
own attorney and concluded that no less should be expected of a dissolving mar-
riage partnership. 64 Every marriage is not, however, considered to encompass a
fiduciary relationship. In In re Marriage of Connolly65 the husband's failure to
inform his wife of the market value of stock did not constitute concealment be-
cause the wife could have ascertained the value of the publicly traded stocks
with very little effort. 66 Factors including the spouses' separate representation,
their separate residences during the negotiations, and a finding that each party
"pursued their individual and separate legal interests with enthusiasm,"'67 led
the court to conclude that the relationship was completely adversarial. 68
Lack of an attorney does not necessarily invalidate separation agree-
ments. 69 Even states that impose higher standards on spouses when negotiating
59. Imposition of a fiduciary duty may provide at least as much protection as a confidential
relationship because a fiduciary duty lasts longer and is not as likely to dissolve as soon as the parties
separate. Sharp, supra note 5, at 1422-23. For a comparison between common law and community
property systems, see Comment, The Development of Sharing Principles in Common Law Marital
Property States, 28 UCLA L. REv. 1269 (1981). See also Note, Property Division and Alimony
Awards: A Survey of Statutory Limitations on Judicial Discretion, 50 FORDHAM L. REV. 415, 420.22
(1981) (surveying community property states and how each state treats alimony awards).
60. 110 Idaho 57, 714 P.2d 26 (1986).
61. Id. at 60, 714 P.2d at 29. The court further stated that the fiduciary relationship continues
into negotiations and requires disclosure by both parties of all information within their knowledge.
In Golder the husband concealed the value of the couple's property and led the wife to believe they
were on the verge of bankruptcy when their net worth exceeded $250,000. Id.
62. Vai v. Bank of Am., 56 Cal. 2d 329, 337, 364 P.2d 247, 252, 15 Cal. Rptr. 71, 76 (1961)
(husband's control of the community property continues by court decree, as does his fiduciary duty
to make adequate disclosure of the nature and value of the property to his spouse until there has
been a division of it by agreement).
63. 56 Cal. 2d 329, 364 P.2d 247, 15 Cal. Rptr. 71 (1961).
64. Id. at 338-39, 364 P.2d at 253, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 77 ("The dissolution of a partnership and
attendant agreements respecting partnership property appear to be remarkably similar to the dissolu-
tion of the conjugal relation.").
65. 23 Cal. 3d 590, 591 P.2d 911, 153 Cal. Rptr. 423 (1979).
66. Id. at 598, 591 P.2d at 915, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 427.
67. Id. at 600, 591 P.2d at 916, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 428.
68. Id.; see also Boeseke v. Boeseke, 10 Cal. 3d 844, 849-50, 519 P.2d 161, 164-65, 112 Cal.
Rptr. 401,404-405 (1974) (husband's full listing of all property assets without complete disclosure of
their value did not constitute fraud when wife accepted his offer without further investigation even
though her attorney advised her against it; husband had no duty to evaluate the assets).
69. In North Carolina courts consider retention of an attorney as a dispositive factor; as soon as
either party gets an attorney, both parties are relieved of the full disclosure duties that accompany a
trusting relationship. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
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separation agreements will not necessarily invalidate agreements just because
one party does not have an attorney. 70 Likewise, the fact that the parties share
an attorney does not necessarily mean the agreement is unfair. In Levine v. Le-
vine 71 one attorney represented both parties and prepared their separation
agreement. Both parties knew the attorney, who was related to the husband by
marriage. The New York Court of Appeals recognized the existence of a fiduci-
ary relationship between the husband and wife and held that a separation agree-
ment could be set aside in equity under circumstances that would be insufficient
to nullify an ordinary contract.72 Although the absence of independent repre-
sentation was a significant factor in determining whether the agreement was en-
tered into freely, it did not alone provide a basis for rescission.73 Unlike in
Avriett, the attorney in Levine explicitly represented both parties, and the wife
stated that she had "complete faith and trust in him."' 74
Even if procedural fairness is met, including full disclosure, some states
additionally mandate substantive fairness by statute in contracts between
spouses. 75 The words of a statute do not necessarily indicate, however, whether
courts truly require substantive fairness in separation agreements.76 North Car-
olina's equitable distribution statute, for example, appears to mandate substan-
tive fairness in property divisions. 7 7 That statute allows parties to make their
own property distribution agreements "before, during, and after marriage" as
long as the parties consider the agreements equitable. 78 Yet, as discussed above,
North Carolina courts have given this language little force.79 An examination of
70. See, e.g., Lowery v. Lowery, 195 Colo. 86, 87-88, 575 P.2d 430, 431 (1978) (insufficient
basis to set aside agreement as unconscionable when husband, who did not have an attorney when he
signed the separation agreement, later discovered he could have received a more favorable
agreement).
71. 56 N.Y.2d 42, 436 N.E.2d 476, 451 N.Y.S.2d 26 (1982).
72. Id. at 47, 436 N.E.2d at 478, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 28.
73. Id. at 48, 436 N.E.2d at 478, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 28.
74. Id. at 49, 436 N.E.2d at 479, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 29. New York does require full dislosure,
especially when only one party has an attorney; full disclosure can mean the difference in whether an
agreement is enforced. "[When there has been full disclosure between the parties, not only of all
relevant facts but also of their contextual significance,... [the] courts should not intrude so as to
redesign the bargain." Christian v. Christian, 42 N.Y.2d 63, 72, 365 N.E.2d 849, 855, 396 N.Y.S.2d
817, 823 (1977) (court will look for an inference or even a negative inference of overreaching, but if
the execution is fair and includes full disclosure, no further inquiry will be made).
75. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-66 (1986) (the court will inquire into "financial resources
and actual needs of the spouses.., in order to determine whether the agreement of the spouses is fair
and equitable under all the circumstances"); HAw. REV. STAT. § 572-22 (Supp. 1988) (contract
between spouses providing for support and maintenance in contemplation of divorce is valid but
subject to court approval and modification from time to time as circumstances warrant); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 60- 1610(b)(3) (1983) (separation agreement must be valid, just, and equitable to be incorpo-
rated into decree); Wis. STAT. § 767.255(11) (1980) ("Any written agreement ... concerning any
arrangement for property distributed [will be] binding upon the court [unless] the terms of the agree-
ment are inequitable to either party.").
76. See Sharp, supra note 5, at 1444-47. Professor Sharp asserts that substantive fairness rarely
is required. Even when states allow courts to set aside agreements as substantively unfair, courts
rarely do so. Whenever an agreement is set aside as substantively unfair, it is usually the product of
procedural unfairness (unfair bargaining, concealment, etc.) as well. Id.
77. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20 (1987).
78. Id. § 50-20(d) ("distribution... in a manner deemed by the parties to be equitable ... shall
be binding" upon them).
79. See supra notes 3849 and accompanying text.
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case law is more instructive than relying on the text of the statute.
North Carolina and most other states set aside agreements if they are so
unfair that they can be classified as unconscionable. 80 Unconscionability has
both procedural and substantive requirements. 81 Procedural unconscionability is
evidenced by an absence of bargaining ability that does not fall to the level of
incapacity or an abuse of process that does not rise to the level of misrepresenta-
tion or duress.82 Substantive unconscionability is marked by inherent unfairness
in the terms or an unreasonable favoring of one party over the other.83 A com-
plaining party must show both aspects of unconscionability to invalidate an
agreement, though generally the two are weighed together so that weakness in
one can be offset by strength in the other.84
The North Carolina Supreme Court has stated, "In determining whether a
contract is unconscionable, a court must consider all the facts and circumstances
of a particular case. If the provisions are viewed as so one-sided that the con-
tracting party is denied any opportunity for a meaningful choice, the contract
should be found unconscionable."' 85 Although there is no reason for the North
Carolina courts to deal more harshly with separation agreements than with any
other agreement, 86 none of the North Carolina cases discussed above has set
aside an agreement for unconscionability. 87 Because a finding of unconsciona-
bility requires both procedural unfairness and an unfair result,88 unconscionabil-
ity is unlikely to be found. Furthermore, North Carolina courts use a lenient
standard of procedural fairness and do not consider substantive fairness at all in
analyzing separation agreements. One commentator noted, "[U]n-
conscionability has been interpreted with considerably greater restraint in family
law than, for example, in consumer law."89
80. See Brenner v. School House, Ltd., 302 N.C. 207, 213, 274 S.E.2d 206, 210 (1981); E.
FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 4.27 (1982). "Unconscionability has generally been recognized to in-
clude an absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties together with contract terms
which are unreasonably favorable to the other party." Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co.,
350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
81. For a general discussion of procedural and substantive unconscionability in commercial
transactions, see Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L.
REv. 485 (1967).
.82. E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 80, § 4.28.
83. E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 80, § 4.28.
84. E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 80, § 4.28.
85. Brenner v. School House, Ltd., 302 N.C. 207, 213, 274 S.E.2d 206, 210 (1981) (emphasis
added).
86. Blount v. Blount, 72 N.C. App. 193, 195, 323 S.E.2d 738, 740 (1984) (a valid separation
agreement is an enforceable contract between husband and wife and the same rules apply which
govern the interpretation of contracts generally), disc. rev. denied, 313 N.C. 506, 329 S.E.2d 389
(1985).
87. See supra notes 38-43 and accompanying text. Some states have set aside separation agree-
ments based on unconscionability. In In re Marriage of Manzo, 659 P.2d 669 (Colo. 1983), the
Colorado Supreme Court held that an agreement could be set aside if unconscionable and that in
order to determine unconscionability it would look at the economic circumstances of each party
resulting from the agreement and knowledge of the opposing party. Id. at 673.
88. Sharp, supra note 5, at 1447 (citing a number of jurisdictions in which evidence of over-
reaching, in addition to terms unreasonably favorable to one party, resulted in the invalidation of
agreements).
89. Sharp, supra note 5, at 1447.
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North Carolina is more absolutist than most states both in defining when a
confidential relationship terminates and in refusing to look beyond the face of
the agreement for underlying procedural or substantive unfairness. This seems
at odds with statutory treatment in North Carolina of other areas in which con-
tracts are made under special circumstances. One such special circumstance
concerns contracts made between partners in a partnership. Judicial treatment
of these contracts is enlightening when considering the validity of a contract
between husband and wife.90 Good faith and disclosure duties among business
partners continue past formal dissolution and throughout the winding up or liq-
uidation phase.9 1 Partners are statutorily obligated to disclose fully all informa-
tion to their copartners, 92 and this obligation continues until dissolution is
complete.93 The reason that this duty exists is that the morals of the market-
place are inappropriate for any enterprise that requires a duty of the finest loy-
alty.94 Such loyalty is required in relationships when trust and personal dealings
are both common and necessary.95 There is social pressure on the parties to
continue to work together to achieve a settlement which carries with it a
message to trust and rely on the other party's good will in such negotiations. 96
This duty has been recognized by courts when dealing with partnership transac-
tions and should be recognized when dealing with an agreement between spouses
as well, for surely the marital relationship involves the finest loyalty. Premarital
agreements are also unenforceable absent full disclosure and fairness.9 7 Given
the relationship's history of dependence and trust, a separation agreement
should merit at least the same standard. 98
90. See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text (same comparison used by a California
court).
91. Sharp, supra note 5, at 1422-23.
92. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 59-50 (1987) ("Partners shall render on demand true and full informa-
tion of all things affecting the partnership to any partner .... ).
93. Id. § 59-60 ("On dissolution the partnership is not terminated but continues until the wind-
ing up of partnership affairs is completed."); see Compton v. Compton, 101 Idaho 328, 335, 612 P.2d
1175, 1183 (1980) ("Like a business partner, each spouse is free to adopt a position favorable to
himself or herself regarding the property's valuation ... [but] not free, however, to resolve such
issues unilaterally by concealing the very existence of particular items or amounts of property.").
94. Sharp, supra note 5, at 1424 (citing Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 463-64, 164 N.E.
545, 546 (1928)).
95. Sharp, supra note 5, at 1405-07.
96. A. LINDEY & L. PARLEY, supra note 52, § 6.03.
97. Haskell, The Premarital Estate Contract and Social Policy, 57 N.C.L. REV. 415, 415-19
(1979). Professor Haskell, referring to antenuptial contracts that anticipate death as well as divorce,
argues that even full disclosure is not enough without substantive fairness at the time of the spouse's
death. Id. at 419. The Uniform Premarital Agreement Act, adopted in North Carolina at N.C.
GEN. STAT. Ch. 52B (1987), provides that the agreement will not be enforced if unconscionable
when made and if a party was not provided with fair and reasonable disclosure of the property, did
not waive full disclosure, and did not have or could not have had an adequate knowledge of the
property. Id. § 52B-7(a)(2).
98. See In re Marriage of Manzo, 659 P.2d 669, 675 (Colo. 1983). The Colorado court recog-
nized that the standard must be more protective of parties in separation agreements than in antenup-
tial contracts. The reason for the additional examination was stated as a public policy concern for
safeguarding the interests of a spouse whose consent to an agreement may have been obtained under
more emotionally stressful circumstances, especially if the spouse was unrepresented by counsel. Id.;
see also Sharp, supra note 5, at 1427 n.124 (arguing that the standard of disclosure used in antenup-
tial agreements also should prevail in separation contracts).
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Separation agreements are clearly different from other contracts between
strangers or businesspersons. They are negotiated under conditions of extraordi-
nary stress and deal with issues of deep personal significance. 9 9 The parties are
uniquely positioned to exploit each other's psychological dependencies and
weaknesses. 10° Other states have recognized this 10 ' by continuing a presump-
tion of confidentiality and trust and mandating full disclosure between couples
throughout the separation negotiations.10 2 At a minimum the nature of the rela-
tionship suggests that summary judgment rarely will be appropriate, since the
court must delve into individual relationships to decide issues of dependence,
trust, and fairness that may not be ascertainable on the face of an agreement.
One commentator has suggested that treating separation agreements as arm's
length transactions ignores the fact that many married women are still finan-
cially dependent upon their husbands and thus in need of state protection. 10 3 By
contrast, even retail buyers appear to have more protection from burdensome
agreements than does a spouse who has been married for a long time. 1 4
North Carolina courts have failed to realize what most other jurisdictions
accept-separation agreements are not like other contracts. Employing an at-
torney should not presumptively establish the end of a confidential relationship
with its duties of full disclosure.
With court dockets already overcrowded, some might argue that in-depth,
substantive examination will be unduly burdensome. 105 Most other states are
able to ensure that certain minimal standards of procedural fairness including
99. Sharp, supra note 5, at 1406.
100. Sharp, supra note 5, at 1406.
101. See Casto v. Casto, 508 So. 2d 330, 334 (Fla. 1987) ("Courts... must recognize that parties
to a marriage are not dealing at arm's length, and, consequently, trial judges must carefully examine
the circumstances to determine the validity of these agreements."); Christian v. Christian, 42 N.Y.2d
63, 65, 365 N.E.2d 849, 851, 396 N.Y.S.2d 817, 819 (1977) (when dealing with a separation agree-
ment the court will not limit its inquiry into fairness as it would in a contract between other
persons).
102. See supra notes 50-74 and accompanying text.
103. See Haskell, supra note 97, at 426. Unlike Professor Haskell, most scholars tend to regardjudicial review as an unnecessary vestige of a paternalistic legal system that creates opportunities for
excessive subjectivity in the excercise of judicial discretion and undermines the reasonable expecta-
tion of the parties in the finality of their agreement. Sharp, supra note 5, at 1403; Mnookin &
Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 993(1979) (judicial approval may protect people from their own ignorance and also might be thought to
prevent unfair results, but in reality the court merely rubberstamps the agreement; usually the
couple is similarly educated and each is able to protect his or her own interests). However, this
position ignores the fact that many women are not as well educated as their husbands and that
women are still more likely to remain at home with young children.
One study showed that women, after divorce, experience a drastic decline in their standard of
living (an average of 73%) while men actually improve their standard of living (average of 42%)
relative to their needs. Weitzman, The Economics of Divorce: Social and Economic Consequences of
Property, Alimony and Child Support Awards, 28 UCLA L. REV. 1181, 1265-66 (1981). "Old-fash-
ioned norms of redistributive justice and simple fairness seem more appropriate than current norms
of post divorce self-sufficiency" for women who have been married for a long time and do not work
outside the home. Id. at 1267.
104. E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25A-43(b) (1986) (affords a retail customer who claims that an
agreement is unconscionable a reasonable opportunity to present evidence as to the setting, purpose,
and effect of the agreement to aid the court in its determination of whether the agreement is
unconscionable).
105. See Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 103, at 993 (discussing the need to find a way to
1408 [Vol. 67
full disclosure have been met; North Carolina could do the same. In addition,
not every agreement would require extensive examination-only those in which
there is suggested a lack of the highest degree of fairness. 10 6 This approach
appears fairer in view of the inadequacies of the current system to recognize that
a separating couple's interests are not always well-represented in an arm's length
transaction. 107
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bring only the unequal bargaining cases to the court's attention without having to sift through all
agreements).
106. The court could look for an inference or even a negative inference of overreaching, but if
the execution is fair and includes full disclosure, no further inquiry would be made. Christian v.
Christian, 42 N.Y.2d 63, 73, 365 N.E.2d 849, 856, 396 N.Y.S.2d 817, 824 (1977).
107. The current system does not provide procedural fairness. "In operation, if not by defini-
tion, the goal of the adversary process is to pursue the interests of one's client in a rather single-
minded fashion, without regard to fairness." Sharp, supra note 28, at 820 n.4. It does not provide
for substantive fairness either. "[F]or all its aims at fairness, the current laissez-faire system of di-
vorce is taking a high economic casualty toll among women and children." Weitzman, supra note
103, at 1266.
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